Obesity, Paternalism and Fairness by Kniess J
  




For many liberal theorists, the protection and promotion of population health is a 
requirement of justice.1,2,3 After all, each individual needs to be reasonably healthy to 
pursue her personal life plans, whatever these may be. But although the state must enable 
this pursuit, it is simultaneously limited by it: promoting population health only seems 
justifiable if this goal is compatible with the individual right to devise one’s own idea of 
the good life. In other words, if a person attaches little value to her own health, forcing 
her to be healthy would appear to constitute an impermissible imposition of external 
values. 
 While this tension within liberalism arises in many public health contexts, the problem 
is especially salient in the case of obesity. As a significant risk factor for a host of chronic 
conditions—among them hypertension, type 2 diabetes and certain cancers—there is little 
doubt that obesity constitutes a major public health challenge. The drivers behind the rise 
of obesity are multifaceted, but public health interventions so far have centred on 
changing individual behaviours, above all overconsumption and physical inactivity.4 
Assuming this is the most effective way to tackle the problem, the following normative 
question arises: when, if ever, may the state interfere with people’s choices in order to 
make them change their unhealthy lifestyles?  
 I say that the problem is particularly salient because the negative effects of obesogenic 
behaviours appear to be limited to each individual in question. A contrast with recent 
successful attempts to regulate tobacco consumption may illustrate the point. Even though 
smoking too is an individual choice, the harms it causes are not merely self-regarding: 
passive smoking is a considerable risk to others. This makes bans, taxes and other 
restrictions of the right to smoke easier to justify, for, as the proverb goes, one person’s 
freedom ends where another one’s begins. The same does not seem to apply to the 
behaviours that lead to obesity, however.  
 My aim in this paper is to present a series of arguments in favour of liberty-restricting 
policies in the field of obesity prevention, and public health more generally. As I want to 
show, a “soft” form of paternalism, which interferes with people’s choices to safeguard 
their true interests, goes some way in justifying such policies, but it leaves unaddressed 
  
the problem of limiting the liberty of those whose true interest is in pursuing an unhealthy 
lifestyle. I argue that in this case, the key to reconcile the promotion of population health 
with the respect for individual liberty is distributive justice: when we cannot help those 
who care about their health without doing the same for those who do not, fairness will 
often require us to do so. 
 
SOFT AND HARD PATERNALISM 
Let me begin by taking a closer look at the concept of paternalism. Liberals commonly 
accept that the state is at least sometimes justified in limiting a person’s liberty for her 
own sake. As J.S. Mill famously allowed, we may forcibly prevent an unknowing passer-
by from crossing an unsafe bridge if there were no time to warn him of his danger.5 The 
idea here is that we are not interfering with the passer-by’s ends, since we assume he does 
not want to fall into the river, but merely with his means. Thus if an individual’s choice 
is clouded by ignorance, irrationality or other distorting factors it is non-voluntary—not 
genuine, as it were—and this might justify frustrating or preventing his choices to 
safeguard his true interests. If we lack knowledge of the latter, we interfere to protect that 
which any rational person would want: the preservation of life and health, among other 
things. If this sort of intervention is deemed paternalistic at all, it is generally welcomed 
as “soft” paternalism.6 
 Now, this form of justification may be invoked in a wide array of liberty-restricting 
public health interventions, but certainly not all. For there will always be individuals who 
put their own health at risk voluntarily; out of their freely chosen and considered view 
that other things in life matter more to them. As Gerald Dworkin has incisively put it: 
 
men are always faced with competing goods, and […] there may be reasons why even a value 
such as health—or indeed life—may be overridden by competing values. Thus the problem 
with the Christian Scientist and blood transfusions. It may be more important for him to reject 
“impure substances” than go on living. The difficult problem that must be faced is whether 
one can give sense to the notion of a person irrationally attaching weights to competing values. 
(p. 78-9)7  
 
The problem, then, is that some paternalistic interventions purport to save people not only 
from irrational or ill-informed means, but from ends which may strike others as somehow 
“mistaken,” even though those who pursue them do so knowingly and willingly. This is 
  
the problem of “hard” paternalism. Can a liberal theory committed to the promotion of 
health support policies of this ilk without undermining its fundamental respect for 
individual liberty? 
  
IS IT A MISTAKE TO NEGLECT ONE’S HEALTH? 
Suppose a government debates three measures to reduce the incidence of obesity in 
society. “Fat tax 1” is a tax on foods that contain a certain percentage of saturated fats. 
The second measure proposes to entirely ban particularly unhealthy products from the 
food supply. Finally “fat tax 2,” a more fanciful measure, involves weighing citizens and 
taxing them if overweight. These measures are intrusive to varying degrees, and one 
might see them as lying along an “intervention ladder.”8 Yet all three may be motivated 
by hard paternalism so long as they not only interfere with the choices of people who 
compromise their health non-voluntarily, but also with those for whom an unhealthy diet 
forms part of the good life. Let us call the latter food lovers: their love for food is more 
important to them than their health. 
 Now, in order to justify hard paternalism, we would need to deny the validity of the 
food lover’s life plan. The argument might run as follows. Even if the food lover is fully 
aware of the risks of her dietary habits, she makes a mistake if she cares too little about 
her health to change them. Sometimes people do not fully grasp the importance of their 
health until they lose it, at which point they are often willing to do almost anything to 
regain it. In contrast, many other values that we might pursue in our lives are very easy 
to appreciate, either because they are more tangible, because their rewards are more 
intense, or simply because we do not take them for granted in the same way. These 
considerations make evaluative delusions concerning health particularly likely, inviting 
paternalistic intervention. 
 As a psychological observation, these remarks are perfectly familiar. As an argument 
for hard paternalism, however, they rest on an invalid conflation of rationality and the 
good. To be sure, the propensity to weigh our values in favour of immediate gratification 
may be a form of cognitive bias or irrationality. This is what David Hume had in mind 
when he declared that there is “no quality in human nature which causes more fatal errors 
in our conduct than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and 
remote.” (p. 126)9 But note that if we neglect our health due to these flaws in our 
reasoning, we cannot say that our unhealthy lifestyle is truly voluntary. If this is case, 
most liberals will in principle accept some sort of soft paternalism to prevent us from 
  
inadvertently putting out health at risk. 
 And so the problem with hard paternalism remains. It is perfectly conceivable that a 
clear-headed person could truly prefer the immediate pleasures of feasting over long-term 
gains in health. The food lover may even be more rational than the one who foregoes all 
joy to stay in shape: if after all the future is uncertain, one may under certain conditions 
discount the future costs of an unhealthy lifestyle.10 Assuming voluntariness, then, the 
choice between feasting and longevity is simply a matter of taste. The conscious food 
lover might share our view about the value of health after suffering a heart attack. But 
then again, she might not. Hard though it seems to imagine that a long, healthy life is not 
her greatest priority, we should not force it upon her if it is not the life she wants to live. 
 The upshot is that (soft) paternalism may often be justified, but not with respect to the 
food lover, who (by definition) voluntarily embraces the health risks of her lifestyle. But 
does this then rule out any form of government interference with the food-lover’s choices? 
In what follows, I want to argue that it does not. Liberals value not only individual liberty, 
but also equal liberty, meaning that the opportunities to pursue our own good must be 
fairly distributed throughout society. And thus, policies which on the face of it appear 
paternalistic toward the food-lover might in fact be motivated by something different 
altogether, namely a concern for fairness. 
 
OBESITY AND FAIRNESS 
The argument from fairness may come in different forms. One which regularly crops up 
in public discourse maintains that unhealthful behaviour is not always purely self-
regarding. In the case of the food lover, it could be claimed that the bill for treating the 
medical needs that arise from her dietary habits is ultimately handed to the taxpayer. It is 
unfair, in this sense, that some must subsidise the expensive life plans of others. Yet while 
the argument has intuitive appeal, it is important to be aware of its limitations. First, much 
hinges on the particular empirical circumstances. Depending on how the healthcare 
system is financed, and what concrete risks the behaviours in question pose, it might well 
be that the costs to the public are negligible, or offset elsewhere. For instance, it is 
sometimes claimed that the costs of treating the medical needs of smokers and obese 
individuals are more than compensated by the social savings linked to their early deaths–
be it in the healthcare system itself, or in other areas of social spending, such as the 
pension system.Error! Bookmark not defined.11,12 
 Second, if the argument is not applied consistently, we may doubt that avoiding harm 
  
to others is the real motivation behind our liberty-restricting intervention. Take the “fat 
tax 2” mentioned above. It wouldn’t be hard to see herein a thinly veiled attempt to impose 
external values on obese people, that is, to “make them pay” for giving in to “gluttony” 
and “sloth.” After all, we seem less inclined to push an argument for fairness in the 
distribution of healthcare costs when it comes to behaviour that is not considered “sinful.” 
As Daniel Wikler points out, “skiing and football produce injuries as surely as sloth 
produces heart disease; and the decision to postpone childbearing until the thirties 
increases susceptibility to certain cancers in women.” (p44)12 While the argument for 
taxing risky behaviour may be sound in principle, the burden of proof in our case is high: 
not only must it be shown that the food lover imposes considerable and unwarranted costs 
on society, but that our intervention merely seeks to compensate these costs, rather than 
force external values on her. 
 So let me turn to a different argument from fairness; one which may be less popular, 
but I think generally more relevant. We have thus far focused on the figure of the 
voluntary food lover, but clearly there are others who do not consciously embrace the 
health risks that their lifestyles pose. This might be due to a wide range of reasons. For 
example, some people are not appropriately informed about healthful nutrition, say, 
because state-sponsored attempts to educate the public are effectively dwarfed by 
corporate advertisement.13 Or—in line with recent evidence which conceptualises 
overeating as an addiction disorder14,15—they might compulsively binge on comfort food 
as a reaction to high levels of stress. Or yet again, they might lack the ability to rationally 
assess the costs and benefits of a given behaviour: though they know that sodas are 
unhealthy, they cannot estimate the cumulative effect of their daily consumption. 
 Needless to say, there is great vagueness as to when an individual has voluntarily 
adopted a behaviour or lifestyle. The issue is particularly thorny because all our 
preferences and desires are to some extent shaped by circumstances which we have not 
freely chosen, such as our upbringing and social environment. The distinction between 
voluntariness and non-voluntariness must therefore be one of degree and not kind. But 
the problem of drawing a clear line should not concern us here, for just as surely as there 
are conscious food lovers there are also individuals whom we might dub non-voluntary 
overeaters. It is reasonable to assume that there is a large number of the latter, and further 
that their proportion will be greatest among the least advantaged members of society, 
reflecting inequalities in education and information. As the empirical literature shows, 
obesity and its behavioural causes are patterned along a socio-economic gradient, so that 
  
indeed quite often “poor people behave poorly.”16  
 Now, the point I wish to make is the following. Freedom in self-regarding matters, as 
Richard Arneson has noted, tends to yield better results for those who are better positioned 
to choose among unrestricted options.17 This in itself would perhaps not be unfair, if 
everyone were skilled enough to make their choices reflect their genuine ends, or if this 
ability were randomly distributed in society. But as things stand, it is more plausible to 
think that the eschewal of liberty-restricting public health interventions would be 
particularly disadvantageous for the worst-off members of society. And so, if we cannot 
protect the non-voluntary overeater’s health through soft paternalism, without thereby 
also restricting the liberty of the conscious food lover, fairness might require doing so. 
 True, in theory it would always seem preferable to tailor our interventions exclusively 
to the non-voluntary overeater, or to rely on non-restrictive measures altogether. For 
example, health education campaigns, or warnings issued on food packaging, aim to help 
the non-voluntary overeater, while requiring no further action from the food lover. Yet 
this might prove ineffective in practice. Not only are these campaigns, taken by 
themselves, unlikely to break existing patterns of addiction. The evidence also suggest 
that they work well for individuals of high socio-economic status, but less so for 
disadvantaged social groups, where the proportion of non-voluntary overeaters in need of 
protection is presumably greatest.8 
 Policies which target non-voluntary overeaters without affecting the conscious food 
lovers face a further problem. How are we to decide, on an individual level, who falls into 
which respective group? One could imagine subjecting all obese individuals to a 
psychological test to determine whether their dietary and exercise habits are truly 
voluntary. In a second step, some form of “fat tax” is levied on those who fail the test. 
But not only is it hard to imagine a practicable way to implement the voluntariness test, 
it also seems highly demeaning to single out individuals in this way: as public recognition 
of someone’s lack of self-direction it would surely deal a blow to their self-respect.17 
 In this light, interventions of a more universalistic character seem more attractive, even 
when they restrict the liberty of those who are not legitimate targets of (soft) paternalism. 
“Fat tax 1,” for instance, does not distinguish between food lovers and non-voluntary 
overeaters—in fact, it does not even distinguish between obese and non-obese 
individuals. And if even “fat tax 1” fails to have a positive impact on the non-voluntary 
overeater’s dietary habits, increasingly restrictive measures might be justified. Maybe the 
sale of certain foods with particularly high fat, sugar or salt contents could be prohibited 
  
tout court, rather than merely taxed. Of course, the adequacy of such interventions will 
depend on the particular circumstances, but what is important to see here is the underlying 
justification: the choices of the food lover are not frustrated for her own sake, but instead 
to enable us to engage in soft paternalism towards the non-voluntary overeater.    
 
TWO OBJECTIONS 
The argument, in short, is that we must balance the interests of those who are legitimate 
paternalistic subjects against those who are not. In doing so, clearly several factors will 
be relevant— perhaps most obviously the proportion of people who fall into one group 
or the other, and the weight of their respective interests. Much work remains to be done 
in defining fine-grained criteria for the justifiability of liberty-restricting interventions in 
such mixed groups.18 The general point, however, is that often reasons of fairness will tip 
the balance in favour of those who would profit from the intervention; in particular when 
they are disproportionately among the worst off members of society in the first place.  
 Now, someone might object that what justice demands are not liberty-restricting 
measures, but rather changes to the social conditions that create the need for these 
measures. Assuming social disadvantage explains why many people become non-
voluntary overeaters, should we not aim at making society more just, instead of simply 
restricting their choices? While the reasoning behind this objection is sound, it should be 
noted that under non-ideal conditions, liberty-restricting interventions may in themselves 
be a way to eliminate disadvantage. As Norman Daniels notes, “some public-health 
measures, such as water and waste treatment, have the general effect of reducing risk. But 
historically, they have also had the effect of equalizing risk between socio-economic 
classes and between groups living in different geographical areas” (p. 142).1 The same 
can be said about public health risks which are based on lifestyles, such as smoking and 
obesity. In short, to reduce the inequalities in health which lead to unequal opportunities 
in life, we cannot do without effective public health policy. 
 But this leads us to a second, more fundamental objection. Allowing the food lover to 
live her live unhindered is more important than helping the overeater, someone might 
argue, because fairness should never trump liberty. One might here point to the priority 
of liberty, as defended even by egalitarians like John Rawls,19 or insist that refraining 
from harm (to the food lover) must always take precedence over conferring benefits (to 
the overeater). But this objection relies on a misconception. If the promotion of population 
health is indeed required by justice, then we are not simply in the business of conferring 
  
benefits or increasing social utility. Rather, we face the problem of ensuring a fair 
distribution of people’s opportunities to pursue their good, so that the food lover’s 
freedom to feast competes with the overeater’s freedom lost through premature mortality 
and heightened morbidity. And from an impartial perspective, there may well be reasons 
to give priority to the opportunities of those who are already among the worst off. If the 
fate of the overeater is linked to that of the food lover in the ways I described, perhaps 
the case of obesogenic behaviour is more similar to that of smoking than initially 
appeared: one person’s liberty is constrained by that of another. 
 Now to be sure, there is always a strong presumption against all state interference with 
individual choice. But there is also an important difference between, say, restricting 
freedom of expression and limiting the range of sodas available at the shop. Not all 
interests we might have deserve to be protected by basic rights. And so, the more is at 
stake for the overeater, the weightier the food lover’s interest must be to rule out any 
restriction of her liberty. Without a doubt there are certain restrictions which may never 
be imposed on the food lover, no matter how important for the overeater. But on the 
whole, the argument from fairness may go a long way in providing a foundation for many 
interventions of the sort we discussed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
My goal in this paper has been to explore a tension between a justice-based rationale for 
the promotion of population health, and the value of individual liberty. Preventive public 
health policy must play an important role within a liberal theory of justice, but in seeking 
to improve health across society, we risk being unjustifiably paternalistic towards those 
who reject these benefits. I have sought to relieve this tension by arguing that (hard) 
paternalism is not defensible with regard to those who genuinely attach little value to their 
own health. Health should be treated as an instrumental good for the pursuit of individual 
life plans, and by this standard there is nothing that can be said to the individual whose 
life plan does not set much store by health. However, liberty-restricting public health 
interventions, which may at first glance look paternalistic towards these individuals, can 
be justified on other, non-perfectionist grounds. I highlighted an argument which deserves 
special attention: if we cannot protect the health of the worst off without interfering with 
the liberty of those who reject our intrusion on principle, there might be reasons of 
fairness to do so. Not only is this not inconsistent with our liberal premises, it follows 
directly from them. The freedom of some individuals must be weighed against the 
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